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TEACHING A COURSE ON REGULATION OF POLICE 
INVESTIGATION—A MULTI-PERSPECTIVE, PROBLEM-
ORIENTED COURSE 
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN* 
The subject of criminal procedure is typically divided into two courses. 
The first is often called “Police Practices” or “Investigation,” and focuses on 
the rules governing police use of searches and seizures, interrogation, 
identification procedures, and undercover activities. The second is usually 
called “Adversary Process” or, colloquially, “Bail to Jail,” and is the criminal 
analogue to civil procedure. This Article is about teaching the first course. It 
describes my casebook, Criminal Procedure—Regulation of Police 
Investigation: Legal, Historical, Empirical and Comparative Materials, the 
fifth edition of which was published in 2012.1 
As the first part of its subtitle makes clears, Regulation of Police 
Investigation focuses on the rules governing police investigative procedures. 
Like every other book of this type, it covers constitutional jurisprudence 
interpreting how the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments govern 
the police. But Regulation of Police Investigation is also aimed at 
accomplishing several other objectives, many of which call for different types 
of materials than those found in the usual text addressing the investigative 
stage of the criminal process.2 First, the book seeks to acquaint the student with 
the world of the police. Second, it devotes attention to the various mechanisms 
that could be used to regulate the police other than judicial interpretation of the 
Constitution. The book’s subtitle describes three other objectives of the book: 
providing historical background to the rules governing police investigation, 
reporting empirical work investigating their impact, and giving students some 
idea of how other countries regulate the police. 
 
* Milton Underwood Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. 
 1. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE—REGULATION OF POLICE 
INVESTIGATION: LEGAL, HISTORICAL, EMPIRICAL AND COMPARATIVE MATERIALS (5th ed. 
2012). 
 2. Some of the following discussion is taken from the Teacher’s Manual. CHRISTOPHER 
SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE—REGULATION OF POLICE INVESTIGATION: LEGAL, 
HISTORICAL, EMPIRICAL AND COMPARATIVE MATERIALS: TEACHER’S MANUAL (5th ed. 2012) 
[hereinafter TEACHER’S MANUAL]. 
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A sixth, and perhaps the most important, goal of Regulation of Police 
Investigation is to promote the lawyering skills of students. The primary 
method of doing so is through inclusion of problems, of which there are 123 in 
the fifth edition. Other practice-oriented materials include a negotiation 
exercise and documents from an actual case that allow review of many of the 
issues discussed in the course. 
The rest of this Article briefly provides examples of how the book tries to 
achieve each of these six objectives. 
I.  THE WORLD OF THE POLICE 
Many criminal procedure texts contain little or nothing about this topic, 
apparently on the assumption that information about police habits and attitudes 
is common knowledge, or is unimportant for legal purposes. Regulation of 
Police Investigation assumes to the contrary that the law enforcement ethos is 
complex and occasionally mysterious to those who are not police and that, 
without some understanding of this environment, discussion about regulatory 
approaches may verge on the irrelevant. Thus, the first forty-plus pages of the 
book are devoted entirely to historical and sociological materials concerning 
the police and their practices, and additional materials on this subject are 
scattered throughout the book where appropriate. 
 The first part of Chapter One, for instance, includes a description of 
how the decentralized American police system (today touting over 17,000 
separate police agencies) grew out of concern about the centralized French 
“spy” system. This development may have reduced overall government power 
but also helps explain why this country has had to rely on federal constitutional 
jurisprudence for uniform rules governing the police. This section also reminds 
students that organized police forces did not come into being in this country 
until the middle of the nineteenth century,3 a fact that has significant 
implications for originalist interpretations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
Amendments. The section continues with information about the scope of police 
training (particularly on legal matters), the demographics and salary structures 
of the police forces, and the typical police officer’s day. It ends with excerpts 
from sociological literature on police attitudes, police use of violence and 
deception, and the police and race. The overarching themes of these materials 
focus on why we might need to regulate the police and why it might be hard to 
do so. 
 
 3. See generally Wesley M. Oliver, The Neglected History of Criminal Procedure, 1850–
1940, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 447, 447–48 (2010) (“Professional police departments did not exist in 
the eighteenth century, and Framing Era constables did not investigate crimes.”). 
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II.  SOURCES OF LEGAL REGULATION 
In this country, we tend to assume that the federal courts should be the 
source of most rules governing law enforcement. Yet state courts, legislatures, 
police departments, and even international organizations provide alternative, or 
at least supplemental, sources of law. Accordingly, Chapter One devotes space 
not only to the incorporation doctrine (which is often the only issue in this area 
covered by other books) but also provides material on the revolution in state 
constitutional law, the possibility of relying on domestic legislation and 
international treaties as regulatory sources, and police promulgation of rules. 
Later chapters occasionally note legislative and police enactments that attempt 
to implement or compete with court decisions. For instance, the FBI guidelines 
on use of stings and informants are described in some detail in the chapter on 
undercover operations. 
The principle vehicle for acquainting the students with this plethora of 
regulatory sources is the case of Tennessee v. Garner,4 set out as a “Problem” 
in Chapter One. After first exploring whether the Supreme Court should have 
the authority to impose its rule governing police use of deadly force on the 
police departments of all fifty states (the incorporation issue), the materials ask 
the students to assume that Mr. Garner lost at the Supreme Court level. That 
twist allows discussion of whether he could have pursued the same claim in 
state court under the Tennessee State Constitution or under international law 
(specifically, the International Convention on Political and Civil Rights), and 
also triggers debates about whether legislation, at either the federal or state 
level, or administrative rulemaking is a better way to resolve the complicated 
issue of when police may use deadly force. 
III.  HISTORY 
It is a major assumption of Regulation of Police Investigation that, for a 
number of reasons, students ought to appreciate the historical pedigree of 
current rules. Most obviously, under our constitutional system, history helps us 
decide whether doctrines, such as the right to remain silent and the 
exclusionary rule, are “fundamental.” History also improves our understanding 
of why some rules are the way they are and occasionally provides some 
interesting alternative methods of regulation. While many casebooks ably treat 
the Supreme Court's cases from the 1960s onward, many do not give students 
much sense of what existed before that time and thus leave the impression that 
these rules were created almost out of whole cloth. Regulation of Police 
Investigation tries to avoid that impression. 
For instance, the beginning of Chapter Two, on searches and seizures, 
explores the debates about whether the framers wanted the Fourth Amendment 
 
 4. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
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to regulate all searches or simply aimed at prohibiting general warrants. 
Chapter Three, on interrogations, describes how the privilege against self-
incrimination grew out of treason and heresy proceedings, which raises the 
question of why the privilege should apply to the prosecution of street crimes. 
The chapter also explains that most interrogations during colonial times were 
carried out by magistrates in open court, suggesting a possible alternative to 
Miranda v. Arizona.5 Chapter Four’s treatment of the right to counsel, in the 
context of identification procedures, notes that the right was originally meant 
to provide defendants legal assistance solely on matters of law not 
development of the facts (which is arguably what identification procedures 
involve). Chapter Five, on undercover operations, provides information about 
the “thief-taking” practices that preceded modern-day informants, who may 
not be that different from their historical counterparts. Finally, Chapter Six, on 
remedies, offers material on colonial damages actions, and the genesis of the 
exclusionary rule in Entick v. Carrington6 and Boyd v. United States.7 
IV.  EMPIRICS 
Until the 1970s, very little empirical work on the impact and legitimacy of 
the legal rules that regulate the police was available. Now, however, there exist 
several studies testing various judicial assumptions about police and citizen 
behavior, including, for instance, research concerning societal expectations of 
privacy, the impact of the warrant requirement, the effect of the Miranda 
warnings, the accuracy of eyewitness identification, and the efficacy of various 
sanctions against the police. Regulation of Police Investigation, again, in 
contrast to many books on the topic, describes much of this work, usually in 
summary form, occasionally through longer excerpts. The objective here is not 
only to give students the benefit of information that has played an increasingly 
important role in both judicial and legislative decision-making but also to 
provide an opportunity for them to practice, at least in a superficial way, 
evaluating facts found in the form of “data.” 
Thus, for instance, the students are given the results of the study I 
conducted with Joseph Schumacher, ascertaining lay views on the relative 
intrusiveness of various police investigation techniques—many of which 
contradict the Court’s conclusions about expectations of privacy society is 
prepared to recognize as reasonable—along with commentary on the internal 
and external validity of this type of study.8 The chapter on interrogation reports 
 
 5. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 6. Entick v. Carrington, [1765] 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029 (Eng.). 
 7. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
 8. Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and 
Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and 
Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727 (1993). 
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research on the extent to which Miranda reduced confession and clearance 
rates, and the chapter on identifications describes the differing false positive 
and false negative rates that result from traditional “simultaneous” lineups or 
photo arrays and the recently popular “sequential” identification procedure. 
Information is also provided on research examining the efficacy of undercover 
operations, and the relative deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule and a 
damages regime. 
V.  OTHER COUNTRIES 
Americans tend to believe that our country leads the way in the civil rights 
arena. But that is clearly not true with respect to some aspects of police 
regulation (particularly in the interrogation context). Information about 
practice in other countries also reminds us that our way of doing things is not 
inevitable; for instance, judicial review, localized police forces, and warrants 
issued by a judge are not the norm. That is why, as I have explained in detail 
elsewhere,9 Regulation of Police Investigation includes descriptions of various 
practices not only in England and Germany (which, to the extent other books 
contain comparative material, are the usual foreign reference points) but also in 
countries like Australia, Denmark, India, and France. 
Additionally, to provide context for the comparative descriptions, Chapter 
One provides some background on systemic differences between our 
“adversarial model,” the “non-adversary model” of criminal procedure (which 
frames the European continent’s approach to criminal justice), and the “family 
model” of criminal procedure (which provides a very rough analogue to Asian 
systems but is also in some ways related to the Supreme Court’s “special 
needs” cases).10 One lesson here is that the tension between efficiency and 
protection of individual rights, although relevant to the analysis of any 
procedural system, is heightened by American adversarialism. The non-
adversary and family models represent, in theory at least, quite different 
procedural systems. The students work through these differences by comparing 
how Miranda’s holding would fare under Herbert Packer’s “due process 
model” of American criminal procedure (well), his “crime control model” of 
 
 9. Christopher Slobogin, Transnational Law and Regulation of the Police, 56 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 451, 452–55 (2006). 
 10. See Mirjan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal 
Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 555–78 (1973) (examining 
characteristics of both adversarial and non-adversary models); John Griffiths, Ideology in 
Criminal Procedure or a Third “Model” of the Criminal Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359, 371–91 
(1970) (describing the “family model”). 
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American procedure (not so well), the European “non-adversary model” (not 
well), and the “family model” (really not well).11 
VI.  LAWYERING SKILLS 
The most important mechanism for promoting the final objective of the 
book is discussion of the problems. The problem method is a deservedly 
popular pedagogical tool because it provides students with hands-on 
experience applying the materials in the course.12 The innovation in Regulation 
of Police Investigation is that most of the problems are based on Supreme 
Court decisions, which reduces the verbiage students have to read at the same 
time it exposes them to all the important cases. A side benefit of this treatment 
of the Court’s cases is that, despite addition of the diverse materials already 
described, the average assignment for a fifty-minute class is less than fifteen 
pages. 
Some of the problems, like the Garner and Miranda problems mentioned 
above, are best discussed as a class. But most lend themselves well to role-
playing in a manner approaching the reality of a suppression hearing. I usually 
require each student to argue two of these problems by the end of the semester, 
either as a prosecutor or as a defense attorney. If the problem assignments are 
made well enough in advance, the discussion is of higher quality than is 
typically the case, and the whole class benefits. The Teacher’s Manual 
provides model arguments, which I sometimes give to the class after the 
relevant “suppression hearings” have taken place as one method of providing 
feedback. Below are three examples of problems (found in the text) and the 
model arguments for each (found in the Teacher’s Manual). All three problems 
deal with the definition of probable cause, a topic covered in Part I of Chapter 
Two (which is the chapter on searches and seizures). 
The three problems come after the students have read an excerpt from the 
National Center for State Courts’ unique study of the warrant process, viewed 
a sample warrant, and looked at material on the Supreme Court’s case law in 
this area (including a lightly edited reproduction of Illinois v. Gates13). The 
first problem following this discussion, set out below, describes the facts of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Spinelli v. United States.14 After another problem 
 
 11. See generally Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1 (1964) (describing the “due process model” and the “crime control model”). 
 12. See Myron Moskovitz, Beyond the Case Method: It’s Time to Teach With Problems, 42 
J. LEGAL EDUC. 241, 241–42 (1992). 
 13. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233 (1983) (reversing Spinelli’s holding that the 
government must demonstrate sufficiency with respect to both the basis of the informant’s 
information and the informant’s veracity, and instead holding that “a deficiency in one [prong] 
may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to 
the other, or by some other indicia of reliability”) (emphasis added). 
 14. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). 
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concerning informants (based on Alabama v. White15), the book turns to the 
meaning of probable cause, reasonable suspicion, and other Fourth 
Amendment justification standards. One of the problems following this 
discussion is derived from People v. Quintero,16 a lesser known Supreme Court 
case; that problem is also set out below. Following a note on police use of 
profiling, another problem in this section, and the final one presented here, is 
based on data from a Drug Enforcement Administration courier interception 
program. Pay special attention to how the discussion can build on previous 
materials. 
PROBLEM 317 
SPINELLI v. UNITED STATES 
393 U.S. 410 (1969) 
  The affidavit attached to the search warrant read as follows: 
  I, Robert L. Bender, being duly sworn, depose and say that I am a Special 
Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and as such am authorized to 
make searches and seizures. [In the next 13 paragraphs, the affidavit alleged 
that William Spinelli had been observed driving to, parking near and/or 
entering the apartment in the southwest corner of The Chieftain Manor 
Apartments located at 1108 Indian Circle Drive on August 6, August 11, 
August 12, August 13, and August 16, 1965.] 
  The records of the Southwestern Bell Telephone Company reflect that 
there are two telephones located in the southwest corner apartment on the 
second floor of the apartment building located at 1108 Indian Circle Drive 
under the name of Grace P. Hagen. The numbers listed in the Southwestern 
Bell Telephone Company records for the aforesaid telephones are WYdown 4-
0029 and WYdown 4-0136. 
  William Spinelli is known to this affiant and to federal law enforcement 
agents and local law enforcement agents as a bookmaker, an associate of 
bookmakers, a gambler, and an associate of gamblers. 
  The Federal Bureau of Investigation has been informed by a confidential 
reliable informant that William Spinelli is operating a handbook and accepting 
wagers and disseminating wagering information by means of the telephones, 
which have been assigned the numbers WYdown 4-0029 and WYdown 4-
0136. 
  /s/Robert L. Bender, 
  Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
 
 15. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990). 
 16. People v. Quintero, 657 P.2d 948 (Colo. 1983). 
 17. SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 143–44. 
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  Subscribed and sworn to before me this 18th day of August, 1965, at St. 
Louis, Missouri. 
  /s/William R. O’Toole 
  Should a warrant be issued? [The Supreme Court held 5–3 (Justice 
Marshall not participating) that Aguilar’s two-prong test was not met. Gates 
affirmed Spinelli’s result under its totality of the circumstances test, although 
somewhat reluctantly.] 
MODEL ARGUMENTS AND COMMENT (FROM THE TEACHER’S MANUAL)18 
Prosecution: With respect to the basis of the information prong, the 
confidential informant would have had to have obtained the phone numbers 
from Spinelli or a source close to him because, given the name they were 
under, the numbers could not have been obtained from the phone book. As to 
the veracity prong, the FBI verified that the numbers belonged to an apartment 
frequented by Spinelli; this corroborated more than innocent activity, since it is 
unusual (or at least was at that time) for an apartment to have two phone 
numbers. Combined with the informant's implicit admission he had played the 
numbers and the FBI’s knowledge of Spinelli’s reputation, the veracity prong 
is more than satisfied. At the least, these factors meet the Gates test, and 
perhaps even meet Aguilar-Spinelli.19 
Defense: Starting with the veracity issue, to the extent there is any declaration 
against interest here it should be disregarded, since, as Skolnick points out [in 
an excerpt from Justice Without Trial20 that preceded this problem], 
informants are usually promised informal immunity. Likewise, the reputation 
evidence is irrelevant, since the agents did not indicate how information about 
Spinelli’s reputation was obtained; for instance, it may have come from other 
equally unreliable informants. Compared to the amount of corroboration in 
cases like Gates and Draper [v. United States,21 described in Gates], the 
corroboration here was minimal. Only one fact—Spinelli’s proximity to the 
phone number—was verified, and, as Justice Harlan pointed out for the Court, 
that merely showed that Spinelli may have used the phones for some purpose, 
not necessarily bookmaking. Finally, and most importantly, there is no way of 
determining how the informant came upon this information about Spinelli. 
This deficiency cannot be made up for by the paltry support for the informant’s 
veracity. 
 
 18. TEACHER’S MANUAL, supra note 2, at 21–22. 
 19. The Aguilar-Spinelli test grew out of the Court’s decisions in Aguilar v. Texas and 
Spinelli. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964); Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 410. Notice that the 
students are required to make their arguments based on today’s law, which means that Gates, not 
Aguilar-Spinelli, states the governing law. 
 20. JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC 
SOCIETY 120–27 (2d ed. 1975). 
 21. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959). 
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Comment: The defense might build on this last point by asking the following 
questions: Why didn’t the police simply get their informant to call the 
indicated numbers when they knew Spinelli was in the apartment, thereby 
obtaining first-hand information about his book-making activity? Doesn’t the 
fact that they didn’t do this suggest a lack of personal knowledge on the part of 
the informant, or worse, that the informant never existed (cf. note on p. 145–46 
[describing cases involving non-existent informants])? Innuendo about the 
Spinelli case, never confirmed, was that the “confidential reliable informant” 
was an illegal wiretap. That possibility raises the issue prompted by the Note 
on p. 146–47 [on the Informant’s Privilege]—should we force the police to 
produce their informants, or would that demolish the system? Arguably, the ex 
parte nature of the warrant process would protect against exposure of 
informants’ identities, but as the NCSC study indicates, the police do not think 
so; they would rather lose a case than expose their C.Is. Note also the number 
of paragraphs in the application, which suggest [one] reason the process takes 
so long—police drafting warrant applications may erroneously believe they 
have to be lawyers. 
PROBLEM 622 
PEOPLE v. QUINTERO 
657 P.2d 948 (Colo. 1983) 
  While sweeping her porch on a hot day, Mrs. Bergan saw Quintero go up 
on the porch of the house opposite hers and stand at the front door for 
approximately twenty seconds, then peer in the front window for 
approximately the same period of time. He then left the porch and proceeded 
north, apparently looking at the windows on the side of the house. 
Occasionally looking at Mrs. Bergan, he continued walking, stopped at another 
house, and disappeared from Mrs. Bergan’s view. She next saw Quintero about 
an hour later at the bus stop near her home. He was clad only in a T-shirt, 
having taken off his shirt and put it over a TV set. He paced nervously and 
tried to thumb a ride or hitchhike while waiting for the bus to arrive. Mrs. 
Bergan called the police station, which dispatched an officer to the location to 
find a possible burglary suspect. The officer arrived five minutes after Mrs. 
Bergan’s call and asked Quintero for identification. He had none. After other 
officers arrived, Quintero claimed that he had bought the television set from 
someone in the neighborhood for $100. An officer then “frisked” Quintero for 
weapons, finding brown wool gloves in his back pocket. Mrs. Bergan arrived 
on the scene and identified herself, at which point Quintero was arrested. The 
television and other items found under his shirt and on his person were later 
found to have been stolen. 
  A reasonable suspicion of danger is required before the police can frisk 
someone. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Did the police have such 
reasonable suspicion at the time Quintero was frisked? Did they have probable 
 
 22. SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 150. 
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cause at the time he was arrested? [The Colorado Supreme Court did not 
address the first question, and found, with one dissenter, that probable cause 
did not exist at the time of the arrest.] 
MODEL ARGUMENTS AND COMMENT23 
Prosecution: The police dispatcher had enough detail from Mrs. Bergan, and 
knew enough about her identity, to meet the minimal credibility test of 
Alabama v. White [which, as noted above, the students have already 
discussed]. And Bergan’s information—to wit, Quintero’s strangeness to the 
neighborhood, his initial behavior consistent with “scoping out” a house (cf. 
Terry [the facts of which have been described in previous material]), the 
incongruity of returning with a TV set an hour later, his nervousness at that 
time, and his apparently urgent desire to get out of the area—provided 
reasonable suspicion that Quintero had committed a burglary. Thus, police on 
the scene could rely on the dispatch report, as permitted by United States v. 
Hensley24 [described in previous materials]. Since burglars are often dangerous 
(see Tennessee v. Garner, dissenting opinion [included in Chapter One]), the 
frisk was also justified, especially in light of his lack of identification. Upon 
finding the wool gloves (suspicious items on a hot day) and the other items 
under his shirt, and upon discovering that Mrs. Bergan was a local resident 
(and therefore presumptively a reliable reporter of his previous behavior), the 
officers had probable cause to arrest him for burglary. 
Defense: Quintero’s behavior, as described by Mrs. Bergan, is at least as 
consistent with attempts to find a friend’s house and buy a TV there as it is 
with burglary; unlike in Terry, there were not repeated attempts to look in the 
windows and Mrs. Bergan’s belief that his behavior was “suspicious” is not 
entitled to the same deference as the veteran officer’s fears in Terry. Even if 
we assume that the police had enough suspicion to stop Quintero in connection 
with a burglary, the frisk was unjustified, since his story that he had bought the 
TV was not contradicted by anything the police had seen or heard at that point 
and since, in his disrobed state, the police could see he had no weapon. Thus, 
the wool gloves, and the items under the shirt, should not have been discovered 
and were fruit of the poisonous tree. Even knowing about these items, 
however, did not give them probable cause to arrest for burglary, since they 
still had made no effort to check out Quintero’s story or ascertain whether 
there had been a burglary report. 
Comment: Although putting this Problem here could be seen as premature 
given its partial focus on the Terry stop and frisk, the objective at this point is 
not to debate the pros and cons of that case (which is undertaken in Part III of 
this chapter), but to demonstrate two important points about probable cause 
that are useful for the students to know now, prior to studying the rest of this 
part [on the warrant and probable cause requirements] and Part II [on the scope 
 
 23. TEACHER’S MANUAL, supra note 2, at 23–24. 
 24. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 231–32 (1985). 
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of the Fourth Amendment]: (1) that probable cause is different from reasonable 
suspicion: the police could not have arrested Quintero when they first arrived, 
or even after they found he had no identification; and (2) the related point that 
probable cause can develop (and arguably did develop in this case, the 
Colorado court’s opinion notwithstanding) through increasingly intrusive 
actions by the police (asking for ID, questions, frisk) each of which is justified 
by the requisite suspicion at the time it is taken. The class might be interested 
to know the U.S. Supreme Court accepted certiorari in this case (subsequently 
dismissed when Quintero died) to decide whether it should announce a “good 
faith” exception to the exclusionary rule in cases where the police believed 
they had probable cause but in fact did not. If, as is presumably the case, “good 
faith” probable cause is a lower level of certainty than probable cause, how 
would it differ from reasonable suspicion? Is the concept a coherent one? 
PROBLEM 825 
The DEA Airport Surveillance Program: 
An Analysis of Agent Activities (1984) 
  During an 8-week period in 1982 the Drug Enforcement Administration 
observed the airport investigations of its agents on a nationwide basis, 
involving the survey of approximately 107,000 passengers. Of this number, 
146 people were approached by DEA agents; 120 of these were approached on 
the basis of a drug courier profile similar to those described above. Of the 146 
contacts, 103 were searched either after consent or incident to arrest. The 
searches produced evidence of drug-related crime in 48 cases, or 34% of those 
originally stopped and 48% of those searched. 
  Based on this information, do DEA agents have “probable cause” to arrest 
a person who meets their “profile”? “Reasonable suspicion” to ask for 
identification and ticket, name, and business? 
MODEL ARGUMENTS AND COMMENT26 
Prosecution: The profile produced a 34% hit rate for stops and a 48% hit rate 
for searches; these percentages are almost identical to what we would require 
for reasonable suspicion and probable cause if we were to quantify those 
certainty levels [earlier materials on the definition of probable cause and 
reasonable suspicion described a study reporting how federal judges quantified 
these standards]. Criticisms of these profiles are misguided. They merely make 
explicit the types of factors police have always relied on. In State v. Zelinske27 
[a previous problem], for instance, it was presumably appropriate for the police 
to rely on the experience of previous officers who had noted (and even put in a 
regulation) the fact that cars with deodorizers are more suspicious than those 
without them. Similarly, in finding probable cause in Gates, the Court relied 
 
 25. SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 153. 
 26. TEACHER’S MANUAL, supra note 2, at 25–26. 
 27. State v. Zelinske, 779 P.2d 971, 973 (N.M. 1989). 
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on the “generalized” fact that people usually don’t go to Florida for just one 
day. See also the hypothetical about Officer McFadden’s burglary class 
[described in a footnote in previous materials]. Indeed, profiles are superior to 
this type of analysis, because they require the police to observe, before they 
can intervene, specific characteristics that have been found to be statistically 
predictive of drug couriers, thus reducing police discretion. Further, we can 
control what these factors are so that racial prejudice, etc. does not enter into 
the analysis. 
Defense: The study is highly suspect for three reasons. First, the DEA 
conducted it. Second, 26 of those stopped were stopped for some reason other 
than meeting the profile, thus making it impossible to know whether the 34% 
and 48% figures represent the correct proportions of those stopped and 
searched on the basis of the profile (and also, by the way, rebutting the 
prosecution’s argument that the profiles reduce discretion). Third, even if we 
assume the percentages are representative of the success rate for the profile, we 
do not know how consistent the agents were in applying it—did everyone 
identified as suspicious meet all of its characteristics? And if factors such as 
“nervousness” and “paleness” were included (see Florida v. Royer28 [described 
in the note on profiling]), how were these interpreted? Assuming these 
methodological problems are overcome, use of profiles can still be 
distinguished from other situations in which the police are allowed to rely on 
“generalized suspicion.” First, courts only allow such suspicion when the 
stereotype is clearly suspicious (compare Gates to Quintero, Zelinske and the 
kinds of factors usually incorporated in a profile). Second, unlike typical police 
actions, use of profiles results in the type of dragnet action described in the 
DEA study, where over half of the 146 people subjected to detention were 
innocent of crime. Such searches might be permissible when the threat is 
serious (e.g., hijacking, terrorism), but not here. 
Comment: As the excerpt from my article indicates,29 I believe that, in theory 
at least, police stops based on profiles are no different from other types of 
police actions. Indeed, as Professor Amsterdam has argued (see Chapter One), 
we should encourage police to formalize (as the Iowa State Police [in Zelinske] 
did) what they have learned from their experiences. Another reason for the 
courts’ and the commentators’ hostility toward profiles may be that they make 
us face up to what we mean by probable cause and reasonable suspicion: we 
are apparently willing to arrest or search one innocent person for every guilty 
one, and stop and frisk two innocent people for every guilty one. Perhaps 
probable cause does or should require more (as suggested by the fact that far 
more than 50% of those arrested are guilty and, at least for warrant-based 
 
 28. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 494, 507, 512 (1983). 
 29. Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 
81–82 (1991). Lest the reader is worried, based on the foregoing, that Regulation of Police 
Investigation too heavily features my scholarship, it should be noted that the references described 
in this Article are the only references to my work in the book. 
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searches, the police are right over 75% of the time—see NCSC study, pp. 115–
16; but see San Diego study [on the use of warrants], p. 117). An associated 
problem may be our discomfort with numbers, described so well by Professor 
Tribe in Trial by Mathematics, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1329 (1971). But of course, 
Tribe was worried about use of statistics at trial; even if Tribe is right, at the 
investigative stage we should perhaps have a different attitude toward 
numbers. 
The rest of the book contains similar problems. By the end of the course, 
students should have a pretty good understanding of how to make arguments in 
the suppression hearing context, using precedent and other types of 
information. Two other components of Regulation of Police Investigation 
further hone lawyering skills. 
The first component is a negotiation exercise, the materials for which are 
found in the Teacher’s Manual. The students are provided with the basic facts 
of a (made-up) case and the relevant criminal statutes, including potential 
sentences. Each student is also given “secret instructions” relevant to their role 
(prosecution or defense), which indicate what their boss and their client, 
respectively, would like to get out of a deal. Students are told to negotiate over 
a possible guilty plea, against the backdrop of a number of Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment issues, which, if resolved in favor of the defendant, would 
probably lead to dismissal of the case. The idea is to engage students in the 
strategic and predictive decision-making, which prosecutors and defense 
attorneys undertake daily in our plea negotiation system. This exercise also 
introduces ethical issues relevant to the subject matter of the book (i.e. do 
prosecutors have to reveal their knowledge—disclosed to them in their secret 
instructions—that their key witness has committed perjury in two similar 
cases? Do defense attorneys have to reveal facts disclosed to them in their 
instructions that challenge their argument against the validity of a third-party 
consent or disclose case law that undermines their argument about the 
invalidity of a warrant-based search?). 
A different type of practical exercise is provided by the materials, 100 
pages in all, connected with State v. Longstaff, found in the appendix to the 
book. These materials not only give the students a rich factual context for 
arguments but also provide examples of a search warrant affidavit, a search 
warrant, booking documents, the first appearance order, an indictment, 
motions, transcripts of a probable cause hearing and of a hearing on the 
admissibility of a confession, a court order denying a motion to suppress, a 
guilty plea agreement, and several other documents. I require the students to 
draft a five- or six-page memo arguing the issues in this case, due near the end 
of the semester. But the materials can also simply be assigned as reading and 
used as a review of the entire course. 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
Every other criminal procedure “casebook” lives up to its name by 
including significant excerpts from scores of Supreme Court cases as well as 
from a smattering of lower court cases. In contrast, Regulation of Police 
Investigation reproduces a total of just over twenty judicial decisions (albeit 
often with less editing than is typical), with other important decisions turned 
into problems, as explained above. The assumption is that, by the time students 
get to this course, they have had plenty of practice deciphering appellate 
opinions. Furthermore, in a subject area as politically charged and result-
oriented as police regulation, what matters most is what courts do, not what 
they say. Over the years, I have found that, after carefully discussing the 
leading cases in each area (e.g. Katz v. United States,30 Miranda, and Mapp v. 
Ohio31), I often ended up using many of the Court’s subsequent decisions 
merely as examples—in other words, as problems highlighting how the issues 
raised in the leading cases might play out. Thus, I believe that by giving the 
students all of the relevant facts as well as the result in each case (as illustrated 
in Part VI), the problems give students access to the most important 
information in the Court’s secondary decisions. 
Although it thus de-emphasizes the language in the Court’s opinions, the 
book tries not to slight theoretical considerations relevant to those opinions. 
More so than some books, this book lays out an analytical structure that, given 
the Court’s common law treatment of the issues, would otherwise be 
indiscernible to the usual student. The chapter headings and introductions 
following those headings attempt to give the students a clear picture of the 
legal landscape so they avoid getting mired in tracking down the black letter 
law and see immediately what the fighting issues are. Furthermore, on many of 
these issues, the book substitutes for the often ambiguous and constantly 
changing formulations of the Court excerpts from leading articles, suggesting 
innovative conceptual frameworks. The Teacher’s Manual also provides 
“roadmaps” on searches and seizures, and interrogation analysis that can be 
reproduced and given to the students. 
Compared to the traditional casebook, this combination of approaches in 
Regulation of Police Investigation is meant to be more intellectually 
stimulating on specific points, and also less boring generally, since it 
represents a break from the typical case-by-case analysis.32 The eclectic mix of 
 
 30. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967). 
 31. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). 
 32. One professor who has used the book had this to say: 
All of us were improved by this three-credit vacation from the sometimes numbing effect 
of cases and the routine discussions they tend to inspire. We likewise enjoyed together the 
methodical, hornbook-like introductions to chapters, sections, and subsections and the 
unorthodox sources and intradisciplinary orientation (although there is no philosophy) that 
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materials should also better accommodate different learning styles.33 Most 
importantly, the different perspectives offered in the book should produce 
students who are well-informed about the law of police regulation and are 
competent at putting that knowledge to use in practice. 
  
 
distinguish the text. Criminal Procedure: Regulation of Police Investigation is a serious 
book by a serious scholar—a true heir apparent—whose sharp break from law text 
conventions is as impressive as it is imaginative. 
Daniel Yeager, Searches, Seizures, Confessions, and Some Thoughts on Criminal Procedure: 
Regulation of Police Investigation—Legal, Historical, Empirical, and Comparative Materials, 23 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1043, 1061 (1996). 
 33. See generally Eric A. DeGroff & Kathleen A. McKee, Learning Like Lawyers: 
Addressing the Differences in Law Student Learning Styles, 2006 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 499, 537, 
540, 547–48. 
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